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NSC BRIEFING

9 January 1957

**New Satellite Policy**

- I. 4 Jan Budapest communiqué (USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria) confirms tougher Sov policy toward all Satellites except Poland.
  - A. Emphasizes Moscow control, in guise "proletarian internationalism" (post-Stalin policy--greater Satellite autonomy--reversed at least temporarily).
  - B. But tough political line counterbalanced by soft economic policies, Sov aid for Satellites.
  - C. Satellites (except Poland) hewing to new line--stopped-up vigilance, arrests, renewed adulation of USSR.
  - D. Budapest meeting may have been first of series to come.
- II. With hard line for Hungary, Poland now unique "special case."
  - A. Sov acceptance Gomulka may be temporary: may hope replace him with Moscow followers and, in meantime, are trying isolate Polish influence.
  - B. Polish internal problems grave, also threaten Gomulka.
  - C. Gomulka regime counting on US aid, Chinese Communist moral support.

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**HSC BRIEFING**

**9 January 1957**

**New Satellite Policy**

- 1. The Soviet-Satellite communiqué signed by USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria in Budapest on 4 January and first published by Moscow on 6 January, confirms previous indications USSR has adopted tougher line toward Satellites since national Communist coup in Poland and nationalist, anti-Communist revolution in Hungary.**
  - A. The communiqué, together with a subsequent declaration of Hungarian government policy, also serves as the announcement for the reinstitution of harsh political line in and toward Hungary. The unique status of Hungary within the Bloc, as a consequence of the revolution, has been dissolved. The Hungarian regime's promises of a liberal and national Communist program have been scrapped. Moscow's policy toward Hungary is now no different in principle from policies toward the other Satellites (except for Poland).**
- 2. Budapest meeting which preceded communiqué attended by leaders of USSR (Khrushchev and Malenkov), Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria. Press speculation that this meeting signified the beginning steps in establishment of a new Cominform (disbanded last spring) may be partially correct. This multilateral**

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meeting—a departure from general post-Stalin practices and a direct slap at the announced Polish-Yugoslav position that party relations should be on a bilateral basis—may foreshadow future high-level international Communist meetings.

- II. General line of Soviet policy toward the satellites appears to be one of essentially hard political policies, tempered by specific soft policies, mostly in economic area. By exercising a tighter control of the satellites and their parties under the guise of "international proletarianism," Moscow obviously hopes to avoid any repetition of Hungary and Poland. By continuing economic aid (told Council last week that total to satellites since Oct approaches \$2 billion) and permitting relatively soft economic policies within the satellites, Moscow also hopes counterbalance adverse effects generated by tough political line.
- A. Moscow now realizes it must insure growth or maintenance disciplined, monolithic satellite parties by any and all means necessary. The post-Stalin trend toward greater satellite party responsibility is now viewed as dangerous and has been at least temporarily reversed.
- B. The Soviet leaders also probably realize now that they do not have complete freedom of choice in Eastern Europe, that the pressure of events—as in Poland and Hungary—can force their hand, regardless of their initial

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intentions. Acceptance of this precept is probably responsible for the present blend of hard and soft policies and the apparent recovery from initial shock and hasty improvisation.

C. As reflected in the Satellites themselves, the new Soviet policy has meant a revival of public adulation of the USSR (sometimes approaching nauseous level of Stalin era), a heightened campaign of vigilance against the West, a stepped-up emulation of over-all Soviet propaganda, strong internal security measures and a general harshening of the political line.

1. It has also been seen in the bitter Albanian and Bulgarian attacks on Yugoslavia as a hostile ideological influence.
2. At the same time, the economic pronouncements of Russia and Hungary--possibly foreshadowing similar announcements to come from the other Satellites--have demonstrated the internal softening of economic policies.

III. Another feature of present Soviet policy toward the Satellites is the strange two-way split between policy toward the orthodox states and toward Poland, a split which in the long run may prove untenable and which may already be leading to Soviet efforts to rectify the situation.

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- A. The USSR has temporarily accepted the Gomulka regime and is on the surface actively supporting it. But Moscow did its best, short of armed intervention, to head off Gomulka's rise to power and has not concealed its opposition to national communism.
- B. Moscow is attempting to push Poland into ideological isolation; East Germany has repeatedly censured Poland for a variety of alleged sins, and the Poles fear that Moscow's next move will be an attempt to sever Warsaw's connection with Yugoslavia.
- C. The Soviet leaders are probably already contemplating ways of getting rid of Gomulka. Presumably still hoping to avoid military force, they are probably counting on covertly reviving the power of the bitterly anti-Gomulka faction in the Polish party (the so-called Natolin faction).
- D. This Natolin faction--though small--seems to be on the offensive and is gaining new adherents from discharged party functionaries. [REDACTED]
- E. Gomulka has troubles outside of his party too--the people give him only conditional support and may vote against the party during the parliamentary elections on 20 January.

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[REDACTED] the Party is actually split into three or more groups and that Gomulka and his cohorts have lost effective control of the party rank and file.

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1. One problem is growing anti-semitism; worried Jews-- both in and out of the party--are getting out of Poland. 1300 left for Israel in November, 1700 in December.

F. The economy is also in bad shape and growing worse. Coal is desperately short, unemployment threatens. Present adequate supplies of food and consumer goods may be temporary.

G. This winter may tell the story. Gomulka may survive it, but party forces against his program may tie his hands. Much depends on Party Congress, set for April.

IV. The Gomulka regime may be counting on US aid to solve their internal troubles and the Chinese Communists to help them in relations with the USSR.

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A. [REDACTED] virtually all Poles expect large amounts of US aid--some party figures want \$500 million as a starter.

B. Chou En-lai is due in Warsaw this weekend, following his visit in Moscow. The Poles hope he has tempered Moscow's attitude and will offer continued moral support to Gomulka.

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